file:// URIs from the current origin.
Exploitable when WebView loads local content. From HTTPS origin, this is expected to fail.
file:// src can be created and read.
Also tests via XMLHttpRequest to local paths.
window.webkit.messageHandlers for registered native bridge handlers.
Tests both common names and your custom-specified handlers.
window.
Checks common names like Android, app, JSBridge.
file://, javascript:, data:, custom app schemes.
Key nuance: allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs and
allowFileAccessFromFileURLs are primarily exploitable when the WebView loads
content via file:// scheme. If you're testing from an https://
page (like this one hosted on GitHub Pages), these tests will likely show NOT EXPLOITABLE
due to browser-engine-level SOP enforcement — this doesn't mean the flags aren't set,
just that the attack vector requires local file loading context.